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Abstract Evaluating the safety of different traffic facilities is a complex and crucial task. Microscopic simulation models 
have been widely used for traffic management but have been largely neglected in traffic safety studies. Micro-simulation to 
study safety is more ethical and accessible than the traditional safety studies, which only assess historical crash data. 
However, current microscopic models are unable to mimic unsafe driver behavior, as they are based on presumptions of 
safe driver behavior. This highlights the need for a critical examination of the current microscopic models to determine 
which components and parameters have an effect on safety indicator reproduction. The question then arises whether these 
safety indicators are valid indicators of traffic safety. 
The safety indicators were therefore selected and tested for straight motorway segments in Brisbane, Australia.   This test 
examined the capability of a micro-simulation model and presents a better understanding of micro-simulation models and 
how such models, in particular car following models can be enriched to present more accurate safety indicators.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Traffic simulation modeling is increasingly 
important to analyze complex and dynamic traffic 
problems. The traditional analytical methods are 
unable to describe these dynamic and complex 
problems, and are consequently unable to help 
transport and traffic decision makers evaluate and 
choose between alternative traffic scenarios. Traffic 
simulation models, according to the level of detail they 
can provide, are divided into three parts: micro, meso 
and macroscopic simulation models. Micro-simulation 
models determine the movements of individual 
vehicles travelling on road networks.  They represent 
details of every entity and the relationship between 
them within traffic streams and are increasingly 
important to analyze a variety of dynamic traffic 
problems. Each microscopic model includes three 
behavioral sub-models which are responsible for 
vehicle movement inside the network: Car Following 
(CF), Lane Changing (LC) and Gap Acceptance (GA). 
Each sub-model has different influencing parameters 
which mean it is necessary to modify and improve 
these parameters to ensure they emulate more realistic 
traffic measures.  
Traditional statistical models however, used 
accident histories to predict current safety conditions 
and their disadvantages highlight that not all accidents 
are reported to police; they happen relatively rarely; 
they do not provide a large enough sample size; and, 
the complete situation of the accident cannot be known 
[1]. This demands an assessment tool to evaluate traffic 
facility safety with a dynamic nature. That is, waiting 
for an accident to evaluate the safety impact of a speed 
management plan or implement any ITS infrastructure 
on a motorway is not ideal and an appropriate safety 
assessment tool is currently unavailable. To date, 
micro-simulation models cannot sufficiently create 
enough realistic vehicle characteristics like speed, 
headway and acceleration. Classical models present 
vehicle dynamic modeling and interactions between 
vehicles in kinematic laws and assume that all drivers 
have safe behavior. This lack of a deep understanding 
of human thinking in the driving process also restricts 
the accuracy of the models [2]. 
The potential to use micro-simulation to assess 
safety related parameters has been identified by 
different studies [3-5], though there has been little 
progress in studying traffic safety in general. Some 
work has been undertaken with microscopic simulation 
to study safety at intersections. Archer [6] in fact used 
micro-simulation to calculate safety indicators based 
on the concept of “conflicts” at signalized and 
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unsignalized urban intersections. He compared these 
indicators in both simulated and observed situations. 
Other studies [7-9] determined the safety impacts of 
specific traffic control plans using microscopic 
simulation models with some level of success. These 
all [7-9]  used VISSIM to study safety in intersections 
using a calibration process to adapt their model to their 
safety needs. Young and Archer [9]  modified the 
additive and multiplicative terms in VISSIM  to 
emulate short headways in a modeled intersection 
approach while Gettman et al. [10] reported at the 
same time the inaccuracy of current microscopic 
simulation behavioral models. 
further development of the mico-simulation model 
was made by Brackstone et al. [11] who identified that 
real headway is much lower than believed, and Hidas 
[12] also showed that drivers follow far more closely 
than what would be considered a “safe distance”. “Safe 
distance” is a departure point for one of the main types 
of CF modeling.  A key question is how much the 
previous microscopic models were successful in terms 
of the accuracy of safety influencing factors? 
Therefore, the second question must be to identify how 
microscopic simulation models can be improved for 
traffic safety studies? 
There is currently a knowledge gap in terms of 
being able to effectively utilize microscopic simulation 
for safety studies. To address this gap, other key 
questions need to be address including:  What are the 
components (sub-models) of current microscopic 
simulation models that can affect safety measures? 
What parameters determine simulated driver risky 
behavior within each sub-model of the microscopic 
simulation models? What safety indicators 
comprehensively describe traffic safety status on 
motorways? How should safety indicators be measured 
in real traffic and simulation models? This paper 
presents a platform for investigating micro-simulation 
abilities and limitations. 
This paper is presented in four main parts. The first 
identifies the existing microscopic simulation 
structures with a focus on their safety related 
components. CF models in particular, are investigated. 
Secondly, safety indicators that can measure safety in 
traffic flow and the way in which each criterion could 
be measured are highlighted. The validity of the 
indicators is then examined. .  Next, the preliminary 
test which assessed the ability of one widely used 
micro-simulation models, in terms of safety 
perspective, is conducted. Finally, directions for 
possible improvements in microscopic models in 
particular CF models, in terms of their accuracy to 
mimic driver unsafe behavior are highlighted. 
 
2. Microscopic simulation models 
associated with traffic safety 
 
Microscopic simulations are designed to replicate 
real traffic movement. In most of the microscopic 
models, traffic performance measures in aggregate 
levels are the target objective. To design them, 
assumptions have to be made about the safe behavior 
of drivers, and as a result these may or may not imitate 
real situations. 
Gettman et al. [13] indicated that the crash-free 
design of the general-purpose microscopic models  also 
lack  a reasonable set of surrogate measures for traffic 
safety assessment of a particular traffic facility are the 
difficulties of using simulation model for safety 
assessment. They also questioned the level of 
resolution and realism of the sub-behavioral models. 
Gettman et al. [13] named a few  important driver 
behavior models for safety as Parameterized Gap-
Acceptance Model, Parameterized Lane-Changing, 
Parameterized Car-Following, Parameterized Turning, 
Reaction to Yellow, Variable Driver Reaction Time, 
Intersection Box Movements, Variable Acceleration 
(and Deceleration) Rate, Sight-Distance Limits, 
Rolling Yield, Vehicles Interact With Pedestrians, 
Friendly Merging, Multilane Merging Behavior, Right-
of-Way in Intersection, Recording of Maneuver 
Failures, Parking Maneuvers, Turn Signaling, U-Turns 
and Origins and Destinations at the Intersection 
Corners. 
Young et al. [14] illustrated that most factors within 
microscopic simulations have effects on safety. Some 
safety metrics, namely speed, headway, accelerations, 
LC behavior and drivers‟ compliance with traffic 
regulation, are directly related to traffic safety and 
computed by the models. Microscopic sub-models, 
namely Car Following (CF), Gap Acceptance (GA) 
and Lane Changing (LC), govern the traffic metrics 
reproductions. What presumptions are made in these 
sub-models? How do they work? What parameters do 
they have as input, and finally, which parameters have 
effects on the safety related indicators inside the 
simulation model?  
As previously discussed, CF is responsible for 
moving vehicles along one lane. A vehicle can be 
situated in two traffic regimes. It can be limited by a 
vehicle ahead or freely reach its desired speed. Most 
general CF models are able to function in both 
situations. Also, vehicles change lanes and can make 
lateral movement as well. LC models have been 
introduced to provide this movement types within 
simulation models for vehicle entities. The execution 
of LC will be done by GA models. These sub models 
and their relations with safety metrics production are 
explained in the following Section. 
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2.1. Car following models 
 
Although CF behavior has been studied for more 
than half a century [15], in recent years, scientists have 
been trying to make current models more realistic 
through modifications in a variety of simulation 
software. CF, which involves the interaction between 
adjacent vehicles in the same lane, has potentially a 
significant role in traffic safety studies. On the other 
hand, in new technologies such as Advanced Vehicle 
Control Systems, CF has been used to emulate drivers‟ 
behavior [16]. Departure point as demonstrated by 
Gipps [14] for CF describes a platoon along one lane 
without lane changing. Microscopic simulation models 
make distinctions between the two types of flow: 
firstly, when vehicle elements are influenced by the 
vehicle, the roadway, and external factors such as 
weather or speed limits; secondly, when the elements 
are affected by the other elements. CF points to the 
thresholds between these two types of flow [17]. 
CF model is to understand both the connection 
between measures in individual vehicle levels and in 
macroscopic levels in traffic flow theory. Brackstone 
and McDonald [16], in a review on CF models, divide 
them into five divisions: 1) Gazis–Herman–Rothery 
(GHR) models, 2) safety distance or collision 
avoidance (CA) models, 3) linear models, 4) 
psychophysical models, and 5) fuzzy logic-based 
models. There are other models apart from these five 
which Panwai and Dia [18] added as: desired spacing, 
capacity drop and traffic hysteresis theory, and neural 
network models. Ranjitkar and Nakatsuji [19] examine 
three other CF models, namely cell based models, 
optimum velocity models, and trajectory based models. 
Gazis–Herman–Rothery (GHR) and linear models 
only have “following” ability. For first time “safety 
distance” or “collision avoidance” (CA) model 
introduce “safety distance” to their model. Gipps [20] 
model, the most successful CA model, also was able to 
switch between free flow and following situations. 
Among all the CF models, the psychophysical model 
has completely different structure in which the driver‟s 
behaviour is modelled as sequential control, 
responding to events (thresholds). 
Here, the major parameters of the CF models will 
be introduced. Sometimes, there are different 
parameters involved in each CF model depending on a 
specific type of models, but generally the main 
parameters are nominated also by Bonsall, et al. [5] as 
follows: 
- Desired speed is the speed at which a driver 
wishes to drive. It is usually assumed to be the free 
flow speed on that particular roadway. So if a driver 
has enough space after the leader car, he reaches that 
speed. 
 - Desired headway is the minimum safe time or 
distance between two successive cars that the follower 
vehicle wishes to take. Once two vehicles are travelling 
at the same speed, this headway corresponds to the 
time that the following vehicle has to attain the same 
level of deceleration as the leader in braking events [5]. 
This parameter could indicate the aggressiveness level 
of drivers [21] as it is thought that the more aggressive 
the driver, the shorter headway s/he will take. This 
parameter is speed independent [5]. 
- Reaction time is a critical parameter in both CF 
and LC models. It indicates the time delay needed by 
any driver in order to respond to any stimulus and take 
an action. It seems that this parameter has a key effect 
on the safety behavior of vehicles inside any 
microscopic sub-models. Gipps [20] assumed a 2/3 
seconds reaction time for any driver in his model.  
- The acceleration that a driver may use in a normal 
following situation is defined as Normal Acceleration. 
This value is 1.2 m/s2 in Gipps‟ model [5]. The 
Maximum Acceleration parameter is that which a 
driver wishes to take in a free flow situation to catch up 
with the leading car or to attain free flow speed. The 
limitation for this parameter is the vehicle‟s engine 
power. In Gipps‟ model, this parameter is 1.7 m/s2 [5]. 
- Drivers apply Normal Deceleration in a non-
emergency situation. Usually it is in the range of 2-3.5 
(m/s2). Maximum Deceleration applies in emergency 
braking situations, like the sudden deceleration of the 
leader vehicle or a sudden lane change of another 
vehicle from other lanes. The most severe braking is 
about 5 (m/s2). 
 
2.2. Lane Changing models 
 
There is no universal agreement on the driver LC 
intention structure and each model has a unique 
decision making process [5]. Once the decision is made 
then a GA model applies. The GA parameters are 
examined in the next section though the safety related 
issues of the LC tasks are investigated here in terms of 
the different LC models and their structure. 
A simple model of principle lane change behavior 
proposed by McKnight and Adams (1970) argues some 
points about the cause of LC crashes [22]. They 
believe that driver error might occur at the information 
gathering stage, so the driver may not perceive the 
signs or markings to know whether or not LC is legal. 
Once the driver checks the mirrors, the situation in the 
target lane or road condition in downstream, the driver 
can fail to perceive some of the vital information, or 
may misperceive the information. The errors may also 
happen in decision making or in the execution phase. 
For instance, the driver may forget to use the blinkers 
to show his/her LC direction. 
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Lane change models describe the driver purpose 
and ability to change lanes. Purpose refers to the 
acquired benefit, increasing speed or delay avoidance, 
and the necessity to change lanes, avoiding incident in 
the present lane, traffic regulation, or getting ready for 
a turning movement. The benefit has a vital value that 
triggers a lane change model. Some models consider 
the driver‟s ability to anticipate the need for changing 
lanes. For example, if there is a congested merging 
point further down the roadway, a driver may be able 
to avoid that lane earlier in the upstream link [23]. 
The “ability” is a function of “lane space, relative 
speed and the location of surrounding vehicles”. Here, 
the ability to change lanes has a similar function to the 
gap-acceptance model. The main parameter is the 
minimum acceptable gap which will change depending 
on the urgency of a lane change [5]. Gap acceptance 
has two critical parameters to look at, namely the front 
gap and rear gap (lag) in the target lane. Other 
parameters in gap-acceptance models have influence 
here, too.  
LC has an essential role in traffic flow [24], 
capacity and safety [25]. Lane change includes simple 
“lane change, merge, and exit, pass, and weave 
maneuvers”. “A lane change has been defined as a 
deliberate and substantial shift in the lateral position 
of a vehicle” [22]. Different LC models have been 
proposed, Hidas [26], Gipps [27], Webster [28] and 
others. The Gipps LC model [27], is used in Aimsun 
[29]  and DRACULA simulation software. This model 
uses the hierarchy of decisions. It is reviewed by 
Toledo [30]. Most of these models categorize LC 
models into two types, mandatory (MLC) and 
discretionary (DLC) [24]. Some models suggest the 
anticipatory LC model which could be a non-
mandatory LC. Ben-Akiva, et al. [24] stated that the 
gap acceptance model is used to model the execution 
of lane changes. In this part the LC model structure and 
its role in traffic safety in detail are discussed. 
In the Gipps LC model [27], once vehicles is 
generated, their destination is also determined. The 
distance until its intended turn can affect LC behavior 
along the way. Gipps divides this distance into three 
spans; remote, middle and close. As the turn is far it 
does not affect lane-changing judgments and driver 
focuses on preserving the desired speed. Once the turn 
comes in to the middle distance region, he starts to 
disregard chances to progress his velocity that engage 
LCs in the incorrect direction. After reaching them the 
driver tends to stay in the two appropriate of lanes for 
the turn. Lastly, as driver is close to the turn he is 
interested only in getting the right lane and speed is not 
important [27]. Gipps mentions that beyond 50 seconds 
to the intended turn can be assumed a remote distance. 
According to a study conducted by Kan, et al. [31] 
in simulated data (using Vissim), lead and lag gap 
relative size are similar in off and on ramp LCs in field 
data. However, they illustrated that “most simulated 
gaps are greater than the field gaps”. On the other 
hand, according to the literature, LC takes about four 
seconds, while simulation models do not observe this 
duration. This causes ignorance of the crash 
possibilities in these seconds. 
According to [23], in freeway weaving sections, 
mandatory LC can cause dense LC areas and a higher 
crash frequency. In their study, they calculate the 
frequency of MLC and anticipatory lane changing, and 
ignore the discrepancy LC frequency. They argued that 
LC maneuvers in freeways could directly affect the 
traffic flow, not only the surrounding vehicles but also 
the traffic stream. They concluded that the frequency 
of LC has a significant role in reality and consequently 
in simulation models.  
The MLC or anticipatory LC would not be seen a 
straight segment of a freeway for the first phase, which 
has a sufficient distance with any off or on ramps, 
(more than 60 seconds, according to Australian 
standards). The only type of LC that might happen in 
such a segment is DLC. The research conducted by 
Goswami and Bham [23] illustrates the importance of 
LC in weaving areas, which includes mostly MLC and 
ALC rather than DLC. So if the study is on such a 
section of motorway LC can be ignored to limit the 
study area on the effect of CF models in the micro-
simulation safety measures. 
 
2.3. Gap-Acceptance models 
 
Gap-acceptance is the process in which a driver 
from a minority stream accesses an acceptable gap 
inside the primary stream to cross or merge into the 
primary flow of traffic. This sub-model not only 
regulates the conflicts between low and high priority 
streams but is also used in the LC model to evaluate 
the gaps in the “wished-for” lane. Acceleration rate, 
desired speed, speed acceptance and maximum give-
way time influence the behavior of the gap-acceptance 
model. The acceleration rate, the maximum give-way 
time and the visibility distance at the intersection are 
the most critical ones [32]. The key parameters in the 
gap-acceptance affecting safety model consist of: 
 - Critical gap: The minimum acceptable time gap 
needed for a driver to enter safely into a major traffic 
stream is called critical gap. This parameter can differ 
between drivers and therefore is mostly represented by 
a random variable.  
- Gap-reduction and minimum gap: Some micro 
simulations assume fixed critical gap for each driver 
and some assume that the critical gap is a variable 
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dependent upon the impatient drivers‟ concept [5]. 
“The mean duration of the critical gap is a decreasing 
function of the number of rejected gaps” [33]. The 
critical gap cannot be less than a minimum value which 
is minimum gap. 
 
2.4. Obedience to regulation 
 
This factor shows the level of regulation acceptance 
from the users population which could be affected by 
enforcement policy level [5]. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
 
The summary of the introduced parameters in the 
previous section is illustrated in Table 1. Most of the 
parameters in relation to the models have a distribution 
of values rather than a particular fixed value. Some 
models assume a fixed value for all drivers, and others 
differentiate between drivers or vehicle types [5].  
  
Table 1. Microscopic simulation models 
effective parameters, adapted from Bonsall et 
al. [5] 
C
a
r 
F
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 Desired speed  
Desired headway  
Reaction time (s)  
Rate of acceleration (m/s
2
)  
Rate of deceleration (m/s
2
)  
L
a
n
e 
C
h
a
n
g
in
g
 
Rules for mandatory lane change  
How far ahead the drivers anticipate the 
need to change lanes  
Minimum acceptable gap when 
changing lanes  
Variation in the gap depending on the 
urgency of the desire to change lanes  
Urgency of the desire to change lane  
Willingness to create gaps to assist other 
vehicles to change lanes  
Level of compliance  
Distribution of aggressiveness  
G
a
p
 a
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
 
Critical gap (s)  
Stimulus required to induce use of the 
reduced gap  
Minimum gap (s)  
Willingness to create gaps to assist other 
vehicles to merge, cross or change lanes  
 
According to [34], “the relationship between the 
parameter setting of the micro-simulation model and 
surrogate safety measures (SSMs) is not explicitly 
known, but rather follows from the simulation; it is not 
possible to deduce the (SSMs) directly from the input 
parameters, since the underlying traffic models are too 
complex and partly stochastic in nature”.Two 
parameters, “aggressiveness” and “awareness”, are 
designed in PARAMICS (a widely used simulation 
software) to categorize drivers. However, as declared 
by Bonsall, it is necessary to calibrate the model to 
produce more accurate aggregate results. So it is not 
based on the real population of drivers and is unable to 
provide more accurate safety indicators. 
Focusing on human errors in each of the parameters 
could also critically affect safety indicators. Xin et al. 
[21]focus on the human errors involved in CF models. 
As the first target of the current paper is CF, more 
details are investigated. 
This Section presented a comprehensive coverage 
of the main parameters inside microscopic simulation 
models. Bonsall et al. [5] summarized the parameters 
in a table divided into four parts: purely behavioral, 
behavior limited by vehicle performance, the 
parameters that reflect policy, and fundamental 
parameters like physiological reaction time.  
 
3. Safety related indicators 
 
To study traffic safety measures, it is helpful to 
know that there are three main types of crashes on 
motorways; rear-end, sideswipes and single vehicle 
crashes [35]. However Golob et al. [36] used crash 
location (which lane, off-road, on-shoulder) and crash 
severity (injuries and fatalities) to determine the crash 
topology. The most frequent type of crashes after 
single vehicle accidents is rear-end crashes, followed 
by sideswipe accidents.  
Some efforts have been made to predict crashes, 
using limited time spans aggregate data due to the 
changes in traffic flow as a sign to predict crash risk. 
Oh et al. [37] found that a five minute standard 
deviation of speed of one double loop detector is the 
most significant indicator to capture accident 
likelihood, although the indicators such as occupancy 
and flow also have significant roles. 
Golob et al. [36] indicated that “mean volume”, 
“median speed” and “temporal variations in volume 
and speed” affect traffic safety significantly. Other 
studies shows that headways and short followings are 
the most likely cause of the accidents [38], [39].  
While Davis [40] showed that speed variance 
cannot necessarily be an indicator of individual crash 
risk. In another study by Kockelman and Ma [41], 
there was no evidence to show any relationship 
between speed and its variation from 30-seconds of 
traffic data and crash occurrences. 
As outlined above, efforts have been made using 
aggregate data to calculate crash risk, but it has also 
been discussed that there are still doubts as to the 
effectiveness of using those as risk indicators. To avoid 
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the same challenges, there is another approach for the 
safety assessment of traffic scenarios. This approach 
uses proximal safety indicators as the metrics for 
safety, which will be described in next section. 
Bonsall et al. [5] attempted to answer this question: 
“should micro-simulation model safe behavior or 
actual behavior?”. After performing tests on driver 
speed limit acceptance, distribution of driver 
aggressiveness and a critical review of the micro-
simulation component, they concluded that it is better 
to have “realistic-but-unsafe” models rather than “safe-
but-unrealistic” models. Most of the available micro-
simulation models make assumptions about the safe 
behavior of drivers rather than the actual behavior, and 
as a result they are unable to predict risk measures. 
Within micro-simulation models there is a need to 
have behavioral variance in “perception”, “decision 
making” and “action” processes. There is also a 
demand for more accuracy in modeling driver behavior 
at a nanoscopic level. The interesting idea is to let 
drivers experience errors within simulation [3]. 
Following the same direction, research was 
conducted by Xin et al. [21] called “The Less-Than-
Perfect Driver: A Model of Collision-Inclusive Car-
Following Behavior”. They actually observed errors 
drivers may make and provided more realistic 
perception-response processes in the following 
situation. Comparison of this model, which provides 
variable reaction times, with other normative CF 
models, could be interesting. Xin et al. [21] also claim 
that their work can help micro-simulations in studying 
traffic safety. 
 
3.1. Proximal safety indicators 
 
There are drawbacks in using the traditional method 
of analyzing historical accident data to study traffic 
accident events. Gettman et al. [10] emphasized the 
advantage of using safety indicators rather than only 
actual crash history. They stated that the ratio between 
conflict and actual accident frequency is 20000 to 1. 
Proximal safety indicators can be the appropriate 
surrogate of accident statistics. “These are defined as a 
measure of an accident’s proximity based on the 
temporal and /or spatial measure that reflect the 
closeness of road users (or their vehicles) in relation to 
projected point of collision” [6]. Archer stated that the 
accident proximity measure could be defined according 
to the “safety indicator concept or technique used”. 
The disadvantages of using accident data does not 
apply to proximal safety indicators as they happen 
more frequently and in a shorter period, giving us a 
relative sample size. They provide a more source-
efficient and “ethical” way of studying traffic safety. 
Using them is a “proactive” method which means there 
is no need to wait for accidents to happen to address 
safety problems [6]. 
Svensson [1] determined the following criteria for 
the usefulness of proximal safety indicators:  
1- Compliment accident data and be more frequent 
than accidents 
2- Have a statistical and causal relationship to 
accidents 
3- Have the characteristics of ‘near-accidents’ in a 
hierarchical continuum that describes all severity 
levels of road-user interactions with accidents at 
the highest level and very safe passages with a 
minimum of interaction at the lowest level. [6]  
Examining these three criteria, Archer [6] believes 
that the first point is correct for most proximal safety 
indicators. However, he refers to the validity and 
predictive nature of the indicators when it comes to the 
use of the term “causal”, showing that the indicator 
should happen before the accident and in the same 
situation. Archer [6] concluded that the third point, or 
“near-accident” phrase, shows a clear difference 
between proximal safety indicators and the other traffic 
performance parameters (e.g. traffic flow or speed or 
occupancy) which have been used in predictive 
models. The concept of severity has also been 
suggested by the third criterion, which is a more 
“qualitative and comparative” measure, according to 
Archer. 
Surrogate Safety Assessment Model (SSAM) [13] 
Software is developed to derive surrogate safety 
measures from traffic facilities simulated models. 
Having such tool makes evaluation of alternative 
designs possible, before employment or being built. 
The software identifies, classifies and evaluates traffic 
conflicts particularly for intersections even though it 
can assess other traffic facilities. All LC, GA, turning 
and leader breaking event are needed to be recorded in 
the simulation model to be analysed by SSAM 
afterward. The software safety indicators output 
includes: TTC, PET (Post Encroachment Time), 
MaxS: Maximum speed of either vehicle involve in 
conflicts, DeltaS: speed difference at the time of 
minimum TTC, DR: initial deceleration rate of the 
second vehicle, MaxD: the maximum deceleration of 
second hand during the conflict time and finally 
Conflict type which could be “rear-end, LC, or 
Crossing types”, based on the conflict angle.  
Archer's [6] approach towards the safety indicators 
is the proper approach. He described proximal safety 
indicators separate from “safety-influencing-factors”, 
which could not be classified as proximal safety 
indicators due to the criteria that has been defined; 
however, they affect traffic safety. Some of those are 
traffic performance measures as follows: 1- Speed and 
speed variance 2- Headways between vehicles within 
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traffic stream 3- Traffic flow rate (including related 
measures, occupancy, density…) 4- LC maneuvers 
As a first validation effort Gettman et al. [10] 
indicated that the SSAM can discriminate between 
different design alternatives and tested SSAM output 
against real crash data in a second level of validation. 
They declared that conflict frequencies from 
simulation models are significantly related to real crash 
data (R-Square=0.41). However, the traditional crash 
prediction model exhibited a stronger correlation (R-
Square=0. 68). Lastly, they conducted a sensitivity 
analysis on the few well known micro-simulation 
models and found that the range of conflicts is wide 
across the different models. That is, VISSIM has the 
minimum and TEXAS has the highest frequency of 
conflicts. As a result of observing questionable the 
behavior of these models Gettman et al. [10] raised a 
concern about the reliability of the models and called 
for an improvement in driver behavior modeling in the 
simulation models. While at the same time asked for 
the nature of real-world conflicts to be studied. 
Apart from the efforts to simulate conflicts in traffic 
there is a wide area of research on predicting and 
simulating frequency and severity of crashes. Davis 
and Morris [42] identified that statistical models of 
frequency and severity of crashes  need to be replaced 
with simulation models that can describe the 
mechanism of crashes. Sobhani et al. [43, 44] 
combined different levels of safety simulations and 
used the conflicts and conflict severity characteristics 
acquired from microscopic simulation models to 
determine crash attributes.  This enabled them to 
simulate the possible injury severity of crashes based 
on the transferred kinetic energy to the subject vehicle 
and so use a medical point of view to crash modeling. 
In the following part, the most applicable proximal 
safety indicators are introduced, suitable for a straight 
motorways segment and testing CF in particular. 
 
3.1.1. Time to Collision (TTC). Time to Collision 
(TTC) is a proximal safety indicator initially 
introduced by Hayward [45]. This indicator has been 
used as an alternative for other traffic conflict 
techniques. TTC is a more objective measure of the 
danger of a situation than previous conflict measures. 
Hayward [45] described TTC as “the time required for 
two vehicles to collide if they continue at their present 
speed and on the same path”. 
The actual TTC value is usually the minimum TTC 
within all interaction periods. The TTC is calculated at 
the time of the braking call, within the total Time-to-
Accident [46] measure. These measures are the most 
popular quantitative metrics in conflict studies [47]. 
TTC is used widely, and recent work by Oh and Kim 
[48] apply it as a measure of rear-end crash potential 
using vehicle trajectory data.  
Because TTC is usually measured using video 
analysis, its data extraction is onerous. However, as per 
the literature above, several studies benefit from TTC 
to evaluate traffic safety. The Time-to-Collision of a 
vehicle-driver combination   at instant   with respect to 
a leading vehicle     can be calculated with: 
     
                
               
                            
  : Speed   X: position  l: Vehicle length. 
Minderhoud and Bovy [49] found in the literature 
several values for critical time to collision, namely 4 or 
5 seconds, or 3 or 3.5 seconds. 
For determining TTC values, Minderhoud and 
Bovy [49] used trajectories of vehicles in a certain time 
period on a specific road length. They concluded that 
the minimum TTCs, which may happen during the 
continuous measurement time, can be calculated. They 
also introduced two new safety indicators (TET and 
TIT) which will be discussed in following section.  
 
3.1.2. Extended Time to Collision (TET, TIT). These 
two indicators are related to TTC, and has been 
suggested by Minderhoud and Bovy [49]. Time 
Exposed TTC, represents the time that the TTC value 
remains below the demand TTC threshold. The other 
indicator is Time Integrated TTC [50] is an integral 
value of the TTC profile once the TTC is below the 
threshold. TIT can present an index of severity while 
TET cannot. For instance, it is possible to have the 
same value of TET for a higher or very small value of 
TTC. These indicators can give a deeper insight into 
the collisions. A surface in the TTC profile presents 
TIT, and the higher TIT shows the worse result for the 
road safety. Related formulas are shown below: 
    
            
 
   
 
       
                                                   
                             
 
  
      is a switching variable. TTC* is in seconds. For 
the population of N drivers (i=1…N) the total TET* is: 
          
 
 
   
 
TET could also be presented per user class [49]. 
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3.1.3. PICUD. PICUD (Potential Index for Collision 
with Urgent Deceleration) was introduced by Uno et al. 
[51]. They believe that PICUD can solve a TTC weak 
point. TTC can be used in a situation where the leader 
vehicle with the higher speed cannot be identified, 
while PICUD can indicate safety risk in that situation. 
“PICUD is an index to evaluate the possibility that two 
consecutive vehicles might collide assuming that the 
leading vehicle applies its emergency brake. PICUD is 
defined as the distance between the two vehicles 
considered when they completely stop” [51]. 
The two parameters required to predict PICUD are 
Reaction time and Maximum Deceleration Rate. Uno 
et al. [51] assume 1 second for the reaction time and 
3.3 seconds for emergency braking in their study on a 
weaving section.  
 
3.1.4. IBTR, PBTR. Aron M. [52] introduced two 
other indicators: IBTR (Individual Braking Time Risk) 
or G-value and PBTR (Platoon Braking Time Risk) or 
J-value. IBTR stands for the likelihood of a rear-end 
crash if the leading vehicle stops. The speed of the 
vehicle and its gap behind the vehicle in front are two 
parameters that determine G-value. The higher the 
speed and shorter the gap is, the higher G-value is: 
                
  
      
  
            
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
    
   
 max, Vi, Gapi are the maximum deceleration rate, 
velocity, and time gap of the subject car respectively. 
Tb is braking time. In this equation,  max is different 
for different pavement conditions depending on the 
meteorological conditions and speed limit of the 
section. If a vehicle observes the standard gap time and 
respects the speed limit, the G-value for that particular 
vehicle is zero [53]. 
In real traffic streams the risk of collision is higher 
within the platoon. The risk of collision for each 
vehicle inside the platoon is accumulated by the 
preceding vehicle risky events. For this reason, PBTR 
(Platoon Braking Time Risk) or J-value for vehicle i in 
a platoon is described as follows: 
 
                                                                  
            “ ”                                     
                                                                                     
  
PBTR is an accumulative risk indicator; however it 
vanishes as soon as the vehicle is in a safe situation. J-
value can be obtained from loop detector data on 
motorways, providing the individual speeds and gaps 
of passing vehicles. 
 
3.1.5. Discussion. After car following, the second 
critical maneuver in motorway safety is Lane LC. Lane 
changing, as previously argued, affects sideswipe and 
angle crashes more. In this paper, LC is the second 
sub-task. However the same safety indicators can 
evaluate motorway traffic safety for either CF or LC 
models, because the chosen indicators need spatial or 
temporal nearness between vehicles, which can happen 
in either CF or LC models. Another interesting point is 
discovering if microscopic simulation models can 
create similar traffic flow performance measures such 
as occupancy, speed or headway variances in adjacent 
lanes. If we can create similar traffic flow performance 
measures, would the model be able to create a similar 
frequency of conflicts for LC? 
 
3.2. Safety indicators validity  
 
Gettman et al. [10] in an inclusive validation of 
SSAM software  compared the software with  other 
crash prediction methods  based on  traffic factors (e.g. 
ADT), geometric design and control design of a 
particular traffic facility. They modeled several case 
studies and compared the conflict analysis of SSAM 
with the crash prediction models to identify that some 
cases showed agreement while others did not. Gettman 
came across contradictory results where a number of 
cases show a higher frequency of conflicts while 
having less average severity of conflict values. They 
also found that the safety level of two alternative 
designs may change with different traffic volumes. 
Furthermore a significant number of virtual crashes 
occur by the simulation models at the intersections. As 
a result of such complexities a composite normalized 
index of severity and frequency was deemed as 
necessary. However, these contradictories partly refer 
to the inaccuracy of the simulation models used 
(Aimsun, VISSIM, Paramics and Texas). 
Accident statistics ensure the validity of chosen 
safety indicators. Many traffic safety indicators have 
been proposed, but few have been validated [54]. 
Traffic Conflict Technique (TCT) has been 
investigated for around 40 years. Although some 
authors like [55] verified the validation of TCT, others 
such as William (1981) could not find a reliable 
relationship between crashes and conflicts. Williams 
believes that the reason for this is the lack of a standard 
operational definition for both conflicts and crashes. 
However, Shoarian-Sattari and Powell [46] 
demonstrated that there is meaningful correlation 
between acceleration noise and mean velocity gradient 
in relation to crash risk. 
Hauer and Garder [56] have a different approach 
for validating safety indicators. They argue that TCT 
should be treated as an analytic and evaluative tool 
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rather than a crash predictor. TCT should have an 
unbiased estimation with the smallest variation, and 
validation should be based on a comparison between 
the estimation differences.  
There are difficulties in acquiring and using traffic 
safety indicators. Songchitruksa [54] categorizes these 
difficulties into two divisions: measurement and 
evaluation. He argues that accuracy and efficiency are 
two challenges within the measurement stage, and the 
accuracy of measurements could be improved by 
eliminating the human observer. Songchitruksa [54] 
states that due to the complexity in measuring some 
indicators such as TTC, simulation has been proposed 
in some research. However, “the obvious shortcoming 
of measurements extracted from simulation is that it by 
no means assures that the actual field conditions are 
being replicated”. Efficiency of measurement refers to 
the resource demanded by the indicator, and an 
accurate TTC needs to track the involved vehicles 
every instant, which makes it impossible to use TTC in 
real time [54].  
The second difficulty would be the evaluation of 
safety indicators against real crash data. Songchitruksa 
[54] counted three reasons for this problem: 
measurement error, arbitrary threshold specification for 
certain measure, and the assumption of constant risk 
across locations. Even by mitigating measurement 
errors using technologies such as image processing, the 
determination of relevant thresholds still remains a 
controversial issue. From the well-known pyramid in 
the following figure, it can be concluded that the less 
dangerous an event, the more frequently it happens in 
traffic. Of course, not all events are important in terms 
of traffic safety. The highest part of the pyramid 
represents the most dangerous events that occur less 
frequently. 
 
Figure 1. Continuum of traffic events 
The thresholds should clarify the dangerous level, 
for example less than 1.5 seconds for TTC or 3 seconds 
for PET [54]. Songchitruksa [54] illustrated that “a 
threshold is invariably chosen as constant and usually 
arbitrarily”. He also observed that having the wrong 
threshold level can affect a whole study including the 
collection and assessment of data. The only advantage 
of having a constant threshold may be its simplicity. 
Songchitruksa [54] discussed that the following 
equation was the purpose of past research: 
      
Where C is crash frequency per year, k is 
coefficient (normally estimated by regression) and E is 
a surrogate measure (non-crash event) which is 
sometimes called exposure. Using this equation, 
Songchitruksa questions what will happen in a location 
where there has been no crash in the past (C=0). This 
means that E should be 0 which should apply to other 
locations, which is not likely. He concluded that the 
above should be calibrated for each location even if 
they are identical. In keeping with these discussions, 
this research focuses on the use of safety indicators for 
safety assessment.  
Each of the suggested indicators should implement 
the ambition in real life. Because the focus is on 
straight motorway segments, they need to be applicable 
to this type of carriage way. The indicators should also 
explain risky events in the field and their frequency 
should make sense in relation to the pyramid discussed 
earlier. The threshold should separate the dangerous 
events, and severity also has to be applied to the 
indicators. This study will determine the thresholds 
after looking at real data. For instance, the TTC values 
in the Figure 2 were determined after the pilot study on 
a motorway in Brisbane, Australia. They show that, 
depending on the threshold, there can be a number of 
different dangerous events. In the literature, 4, 3.5, 3 
and 1.5 seconds were used. The most important factor 
is that they should explain serious dangerous events. 
Looking at those events in detail might provide more 
insight to make a better decision about the critical 
thresholds. 
 
Figure 2. TTC values in one location Pacific 
motorway in Brisbane 
Rear-end crashes is investigated therefore CF is in 
interest. If any microscopic simulation model aims to 
emulate real traffic safety problems, there is a real 
demand for a more accurate CF model. TTC, TET, 
TIT, PICUD, IBTR and PBTR are the most suitable 
indicators to investigate CF models that suit safety 
issues particularly for straight segment of Motorways. 
Distribution diagrams can be used to identify the 
most accurate threshold for each indicator. Among 
other safety-influencing factors, the following metrics 
is also considered: 1- Speed (involved vehicles’ speed 
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profile, speed variation, mean, and absolute values) 2- 
Headways (mean, distribution, critical headways) 
 
4. An experiment on a current microscopic 
simulation model  
 
To test current microscopic simulation models and 
their safety perspective, it is important to undertake an 
simulation test using real data and to determine how 
accurate they are in terms of proximal safety 
indicators. The details of the used real data, the 
simulation process and the results of a comparison are 
explained in the following sections.  
 
4.1. The real data 
 
The observed data is provided by Queensland 
Department of Transport & Main Roads (QDTMR). It 
includes eight days of loop detector data collected from 
specific cross sections of the Pacific Motorway in 
Brisbane. The data is based on individual vehicles. 
Figure 3 shows the locations of the data collection. The 
loop detectors collected information for each 
individual vehicle. 
 
Figure 3. Data collection location (Brisbane 
Pacific Motorway, Vulture street overpass) 
 
4.2. The simulation model 
 
To simulate the motorway section, the widely used 
microscopic model, Aimsun [29] has been chosen. 
QDTMR also uses Aimsun to model Brisbane 
motorways network. A comprehensive calibration 
process on capacity, speed and headway for both 
global and local parameters is conducted. Table 2 
illustrates the results of the calibration process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Parameters that have been tuned 
Calibration stage Parameter Calibrated result 
Capacity 
Reaction time 1.2 
Simulation step 0.6 
Speed 
Max Desired speed M
ea
n
 
D
ev
 
M
in
 
M
ax
 
110 10 50 157 
Speed acceptance 1 0.12 0.7 1.5 
Acceleration rate 2.8 
Headway Normal deceleration 2.5 
 
This experiment uses loop detector data. All safety 
indicators are calculated on the assumption that the 
leader vehicle, after passing the loop detector, 
maintains the same speed until the follower vehicle 
also crosses the loop location. 
 
4.3. Observed versus simulated safety metrics 
  
After model calibration, the study platform is ready 
to compare the proxy safety indicators in both real and 
simulated models. One lane in the north bound 
direction is selected for the comparison phase. The 
results of the comparison phase are presented in Figure 
4 and 5, and Table 3. They illustrate that Aimsun is 
unable to create short headways. Similarly average 
speed deviation in Aimsun is much lower and safer 
than observed data below the volume of 1300 vph. 
Speed variation is an essential safety factor in traffic 
flow. 
 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of headways and 
average speed differences of observed and 
simulated data 
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a)  
b)   
c)  
d)  
Figure 5. Comparing real and simulation results for 
a) TTC b) PIUCD c) IBTR d) PBTR 
 Table 3. Comparing real and simulation results, the 
values are critical events per hour per lane 
Safety indicator 
Flow  
(vph) 
<500 
500-
800 
800-
1000 
1000-
1300 
1300-
1600 
Spd Dev (m/s) 
Simulated 9.3 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.2 
real 7.6 6.4 6.9 8.6 10.0 
TTC < 3.5 sec 
/hour 
Simulated 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.1 
real 0.0 0.4 0.8 2.4 3.2 
PICUD < 0 per 
hour 
Simulated 1.8 3.0 8.0 17.4 21.4 
real 12.8 89.0 122.2 123.5 44.3 
IBTR > 1 per hour 
Simulated 0.8 0.9 1.9 3.7 4.7 
real 2.9 25.3 38.0 42.7 13.6 
PBTR > 1 per hour 
Simulated 2.5 3.1 7.1 18.7 25.6 
real 3.8 42.0 66.1 83.5 29.9 
 
Additionally Figure 5 and Table 3 illustrate the 
comparison of observed versus simulated safety 
indicators. In Figure 5 and Table 3 almost all indicators 
of risky behaviors are highly underestimated. This is 
related to the pre assumptions made on the safe 
behavior of drivers in the microscopic sub-models, 
such as CF or LC inside the Aimsun model. The Gipps 
CF and LC Models have also been used in the Aimsun 
model. The Gipps CF model always assumes that a 
driver takes a safe distance behind the preceding 
driver. So if the vehicle in front takes his maximum 
desirable braking rate, the subject driver would be able 
to stop safely [20]. This may not happen in a real 
situation. The same presumptions about the safe 
behavior of drivers are also applied in the LC Model. 
However It seems that Aimsun emulated the IBTR and 
PICUD slightly better than the other measures such as 
TTC and PBTR. Table 3 also indicates the frequency 
of the critical safety events in different traffic volume 
ranges. 
 
5. Directions for the improvement of the 
current car following models 
 
Varieties of the available CF models such as Gipps, 
OVM, Phycho-phisical, Cellular automata, GHR and 
so on, all covers a part of real driver behavior. 
However to make these models stable almost all had to 
assume a safety factor. Any CF model which demands 
a better safety metrics reproduction needs to re-
examine these assumptions. They should also increase 
the other important safety related model parameters. In 
this Section possible improvements for the CF models 
are discussed in two sectors. First, the normative and 
general model structure and second the human error 
mechanism involvement in CF models are argued.  
 
5.1. Normative model and their stochastic 
behavior 
 
Most of the parameters in the current CF models are 
assumed to be sampled from normal distribution with a 
specific mean and deviation. However the real driver 
behavior parameters distributions are not normal, and 
this makes CF models parameters not precise. Yang 
and Peng [57] illustrated that the driver acceleration 
distribution is asymmetrical and suggested an extreme 
value distribution for that. Moreover Using a 
naturalistic car-following data, they demonstrated that 
the distribution of accelerations that driver use in the 
CF situation depends on the space gap with the vehicle 
in front.  
Simulation step is another crucial factor in the 
performance of the CF models. In the most of the CF 
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models driver responses to any action of the leader in 
every simulation step, which in real-world it does not 
occur. Driver may adjust their time headway in longer 
intervals. In addition humans cannot perceive every 
change in speed or space below some specific 
thresholds. Psycho-physical model seem to be more 
adapted to reality in this area. Simulation step also 
limits applying of an accurate reaction time in the 
model. 
The next controversial issue in the CF models 
which should be addressed is the reaction time. Most 
of the CF models assume a fixed value as reaction 
time. Reaction time is responsible for perception, 
recognition and decision making and human neural-
muscle delay time. Reaction time not only varies for 
different people but also can vary for one particular 
driver during a driving task. Another delay that most 
CF models ignore is vehicle delay. Vehicle dynamic 
system also has a delay. Overall, the explanation of 
each of the reaction time components to a random base 
variable potential helps the CF model accuracy 
There are few other terms that also could reduce the 
models inaccuracy, namely applying oscillation 
phenomenon and driver anticipation ability. In real 
situations, the acceleration rate never is zero. Even if 
the driver takes no action, pavement friction, wind 
power and pedal displacement can still cause small 
acceleration. The anticipation ability of drivers is 
another factor that some studies [58] included in their 
model. Driver may react a few vehicle more that their 
immediate leader. The anticipation ability may cause 
that driver with shorter headways. 
 
5.2. Human errors involved in car following  
 
Apart from the real nature of the CF situation, a 
further important issue for traffic safety is driver errors. 
These include errors in perception, judgment, 
distraction, and delay in reaction time. Errors in real 
data have a stochastic nature. To know the frequency 
of the occurrence of each, the nature of them should be 
understood. Consequently their arrival time in the 
simulation model can be introduced. 
Understanding and introduction of human driving 
errors nature is feasible task. The driver errors can be 
extracted from real trajectory data. For instance in 
distraction, any speed outside of the predicted standard 
deviation could be assumed as the distraction error 
[57]. The distraction causes 30% of police reported 
crashes [59] in US, and the cause of distraction could 
be anything inside the vehicle like cell-phones or 
talking with other passengers. Delay time also can be 
investigated when examining the delay between 
vehicle actions in the vehicle trajectories. The random 
nature of this error can therefore be derived.  
Figure 6 shows an inclusive modified CF model 
prototype that potentially can be applicable for traffic 
safety studies. It can be seen that the randomness and 
delays are the components that needs more 
considerations. On the other hand human errors 
inclusion is an important part of any safety adapted CF 
model. 
 
 
Figure 6. The modified model framework in the 
direction of safety studies expectation 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Evaluating the safety of any traffic facility is 
possible using a more accurate micro-simulation 
model. Such a model can proactively predict locations 
that have higher crash risks. Safety impact assessment 
of any ITS application would also be possible using a 
more accurate micro-simulation model. Any before-
after study becomes possible without the need to apply 
real changes in the field. This paper clarified the use of 
micro-simulation models to evaluate safety 
dynamically and emphasized the demand for a new 
generation of safety adapted micro-simulation models.  
This paper examined existing microscopic 
simulation models from a safety perspective. The 
general structure including the parameters and rules 
that govern the microscopic sub-models (particularly 
the CF and LC models) associated with safety related 
actions was also identified.  
 Current general purpose microscopic models 
do not provide an appropriate resolution for 
safety study purposes. 
 Most factors in the microscopic simulation 
models effect safety. 
 The main parameters In CF models of desired 
speed, headway, acceleration and deceleration 
and also reaction time have direct effects on 
safety measures. 
 There is no universal agreement on the 
intention structure of LC models; however 
similar parameters in GA models can execute 
the LC. 
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 Current lead and lag gap in LC maneuvers in 
existing models are unrealistically higher than 
actual exist / occur 
A comprehensive review of the safety indicators 
and their applicability in microscopic simulation 
models identified that:  
  The relationship between the model 
parameters and safety indicators as the 
outcome of the simulation model is complex 
and specifically needs to be investigated.  
 Examining the history of different safety 
measures identifies the following points 
regarding micro-simulation models and their 
applicability either in LC or CF maneuvers. 
 Six safety indicators including TTC, TIT, TET, 
PICUD, IBTR and PBTR were found to be 
quite suitable indicators to investigate CF 
maneuvers for straight segments of motorways. 
They can show the individual and platoon 
conflict risks. 
 Safety indicator distributions diagrams can 
identify the most reliable thresholds for each 
indicator. 
  Simulated safety indicators from existing 
microscopic simulation models vary 
significantly, depending on the different sub-
models they used, such as different CF models. 
 Severity and frequency of safety indicators 
need to be reproduced by simulation models in 
agreement with the real data. 
 Reliability and validity of the safety indicators 
and other safety-influencing factors have been 
identified as platforms to measure each model 
success.  
The Aimsun microscopic model was selected to test 
its ability for traffic safety. It was observed from a 
motorway study in Brisbane, Australia that almost all 
of the critical safety indicators are highly 
underestimated compared with the observed data. The 
conclusion is that the level of resolution and realism of 
current general purpose simulation models need to be 
improved. 
These improvements in microscopic models 
specifically CF models, are outlined below:  
 The CF models usually focus on the 
reproduction of aggregate measures such as 
density or traffic breakdown. For safety studies 
the CF model needs to emulate more safety 
related measures such as headways, Time to 
Collisions. 
 Re-examination of the unrealistic model safety 
assumptions and improvements of the other 
important safety related model parameters is 
necessary.  
 Normative and general models‟ structure 
needed to be revises.  
 The more a CF model explains human actions 
during driving tasks, the more suitable is the 
CF model for safety studies.  
 The human error mechanism involvement in 
CF models is emphasized and it should be 
modeled to identify the safety risks and it 
demands for further research on the nature of 
the errors. 
This paper is from an ongoing research on the 
improvement of the current micro-simulation 
simulation at Smart Transport Research Centre at 
Queensland University of Technology. The 
developments on the micro-simulation models in the 
field of safety are among the research aims. 
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